The Hylands Fireis believed to have been the result of
a lightning strike, probably between midnight and 2.30am
on 24th December, 2001. The fire did not become evident until 1412 hours and 4 brigades were responded immediately. The units on arriving found that the fire was down a steep incline from Hyland Lookout and that it was not safely accessible for fire crews.
24 December - 31 December
24 December (1458 hours).The initial situation report prior to the declaration indicated that the fire was not accessible to the fire crews, the fire being down hill to the west of the Hylands Lookout, a situation regarded as unsafe for direct attack. The heel of the fire was inaccessible. A further situation report was forwarded at 1700 hours on the 24th December indicating that the Rural Fire Service at that time had 24 personnel and 5 tankers on site at fire in the vicinity of Deans Gap Road. The fire crossed Deans Gap Road so the night time activity was based around backburning along Braidwood Road to contain the likely head of the fire under the forecast conditions for Christmas Day. The weather conditions being experienced during the night together with the topography inhibited any chance of gaining access to the fire front and made it difficult to get sufficient depth with the backburning operation.
CHRISTMAS 2001
NEW YEAR 2001/2002
FIRES IN THE SHOALHAVEN
25 December From early morning a NPWS bulldozer worked with the 36 RFS personnel in trying to consolidate the backburning line along Braidwood Road. By 1030 hours the fire had jumped the Braidwood Road and the fire, at that point in time, was estimated to have burnt approximately 900 hectares. 47 RFS personnel were involved in the firefighting effort. Attempts to contain the fire to the west of the Parma Fire Trail failed while crews attempted to stop the northern and southern extension of the fire in the vicinity of Braidwood Road.
By 1100 hours the fire had crossed the Parma Fire Trail and it was obvious that it was going to impact on the Falls Creek and Tomerong areas. The fire was spotting up to one kilometre ahead of the main fire front as it moved in an east/south easterly direction under the influence of turbulent west-northwesterly winds. Police began alerting the residents in Turpentine Road and in the vicinity of the Princes Highway through Falls Creek. The fire intensity continued to build and residents who had previously indicated that they were prepared to stay with their properties now started calling for assistance to evacuate.
At 1100 hours additional resources were requested through State Operations and by 1400 hours properties under threat were at Turpentine Road, Princes Highway and Hawken Road Tomerong. By 1751 hours the fire had run right through to Huskisson and Vincentia, jumped the Currambene Creek and was then threatening the village of Myola with local brigades fighting the fire in that area. Elsewhere, the RFS resources had grown to in excess of 21 tankers plus 2 NSW Fire Brigade units but there was still insufficient resources available to stop the destruction of structural assets.
As night fell large numbers of residents and tourists became stranded in Huskisson with the whole area plunged into darkness because of the loss of power poles during the main run of the fire.
26 December Property remained at risk throughout the Huskisson, Vincentia, St Georges Basin, Tomerong and Woollamia areas. Throughout the day local RFS units in conjunction with 'out of area' resources concentrated on securing structural assets across the area and extinguishing the running fire edge close to assets. The heel of the fire continued to move west crossing Wombat Flat Fire Trail. In the vicinity of Yerringong Road there was difficulty in holding the fire in the floor of the valley.
27th December Overnight there was extensive backburning from some fire trails and direct attack in some areas where grass fuels were more predominant. The fire had moved on to a ridge west of the Princes Highway and slightly south of Tomerong township. This once again proved to be an area that required many personnel to help control the fire. During daylight hours the fire caused problems both in the south west and the north west with numerous breakouts in areas of limited accessibility. The initial areas affected by the fire as this stage were still without power. This affected householders and visitors to the area but it also made it difficult for firefighters who had to rely on portable generator sets and all fuel supplies for fire vehicles had to be delivered to the fireground by council tankers and fuel contractors to keep the fire fleet operational.
28 December Staffing levels on the fire continued at a rate of approx. 350 personnel per shift with most of these resources being drawn from the local RFS and visiting RFS units. NPWS personnel were also heavily involved with up to 30 personnel on most shifts. The fire presented difficulties, moving in a south westerly direction on the southern side of Braidwood Road. As the fire progressed down towards Wandandian, crews were deployed to individual properties for protection of assets. Despite the problems with extinguishment, the fire behaviour was not as extreme as previously experienced.
29 December During the night there was insufficient breeze to move the
smoke from the area. This situation remained almost until midday rendering the use of aircraft impossible. The fire edge could not be checked until the breeze came up in the afternoon and dissipated the smoke. Heavy plant was deployed on the Yarramunmun Fire Trail and off the Braidwood Road to enable tankers to access the fire or to carry out backburning when conditions permitted. As the day progressed conditions deteriorated and it became very difficult to control the backburning. Threat to individual properties was alleviated by deploying tanker and personnel resources to them on an individual basis.
30 December The fire continued to present problems in the Wandean Gap
area despite extensive use of plant to prepare fire trails for backburning in this area. Fuel levels were heavy in close proximity to the trails and as a result it took much longer to undertake the backburning than was previously anticipated. The result was that as the day developed spotting occured from the main fire well down towards the backburn causing some concern about the potential for spotting beyond the established line.
Preliminary work was carried out in advising residents of Wandandian and Sussex Inlet Road of the potential for the fire to still make a run and affect
premises in these areas. This work was further reinforcement of advice that had begun in previous days. Throughout the day indirect attack was used to try to hold the fire up on the ridge above Wandandian but even with aircraft resources deployed for water bombing particularly in the Tianjara Range area, the fire continued to cause problems.
31 December Between midnight and 0600 hours the number of crews on
the fire line were minimized because of the difficulty in accessing the area and the backburning had been completed. During the day the resource level was once again increased as crews monitored the main fire slowly working down towards the backburn.
During the afternoon, under some gusty north/westerly winds, the fire broke
containment lines in the Turpentine Sector. The fire behaviour became wild and erratic and all crews had to be withdrawn from the fire trails. Wherever possible aircraft were deployed to limit the fire spread toward the east while at the same time the fire in the Yarrmunmun Creek area made a rapid run up to and over the Yarramunmun Fire Trail.
Twenty fire appliances from the Queensland Fire Service arrived in the area and were split between day and night shifts. In anticipation of the weather deteriorating they were familiarized with the area particularly addressing safety concerns.